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Negotiating parties can influence the outcome of the negotiation by making vari-
ous types of pre-negotiation investments. These investments are often a form of
rent seeking, because they do not increase the total payoff to be shared during the
negotiation, but only how this surplus is split. They are, however, quite common.
For instance, negotiations are often conducted under the shadow of conflict:
in case an agreement is not reached, the negotiating parties will fight in a non-
cooperative game. Because the outcome of the conflict defines the disagreement
point of the negotiation, the bargaining parties may spend resources to prepare
for conflict even if they expect to achieve a negotiated agreement. This is why,
for example, a government and a rebel group may engage in military actions just
before negotiating a peace agreement.1 Similarly, before negotiating a settlement,
two firms may ask for additional legal opinions or hire very expensive lawyers as a
way to manipulate the outcome of the lawsuit that may follow the breakdown of the
negotiation.2
Conflict is, however, only one possible alternative to achieving a negotiated agree-
ment. The second alternative is further protracting the negotiation with the asso-
ciated cost of waiting. These costs are an important elements in determining the
players’ negotiating outcomes, which is precisely the logic behind the seminal model
by Rubinstein (1982).3 Therefore, an additional type of wasteful, pre-negotiating
investments are those aimed at reducing the cost protracting a negotiation. These
investments have been so far overlooked by the literature, but examples abound.
A particularly famous one is the 2-year lease for a house paid by the Vietnamese
delegation at the onset of the Paris negotiations to end the Vietnam war (see Raiffa,
1982, page 16). In a similar spirit, prior to starting a wage negotiation, trade unions
routinely create funds to support striking workers, so to reduce the cost of protract-
1 There is ample evidence that conflicts are reactivated prior to the beginning of peace nego-
tiations. For example, the mass killing of civilians (thus permanently weakening the opponents)
is significantly more probable during the process of democratization of a country. See Esteban,
Morelli, and Rohner (2015).
2 For a review of the academic literature arguing that the bargaining parties may spend resources
to prepare for conflict before the start of the negotiation see Jackson and Morelli (2011) and the
literature review in Meirowitz, Morelli, Ramsay, and Squintani (forthcoming).
3 See also Raiffa (1982), chapter 6, for several examples, including theoretical and experimental
evidence.
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ing their industrial action and the negotiation.
In this paper we study the problem of a benevolent mediator who wishes to
maximize social welfare, that is, to efficiently share the “peace dividend” (i.e, the
aggregate benefit of finding an agreement rather than triggering a conflict) in a
way that minimizes wasteful pre-negotiation investments. This benevolent mediator
could be a person, an institution, an international organization, or a country called
in to mediate, for example, a civil conflict. In our model, the mediator controls the
bargaining protocol: the probability that, in each period of the negotiation, each
party can make an offer to the other party. The mediator announces the bargaining
protocol at the beginning of the game,4 and then the negotiating parties make their
investments. Finally, the negotiation starts.
Absent the mediator, the possibility of making pre-negotiation investments may
generate inefficient outcomes. To illustrate this point, we model the unmediated
negotiation as a bargaining game in alternating offers with positive outside options,
as in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) and Binmore, Shaked, and Sut-
ton (1989). In the equilibrium of this game, either the players’ payoffs depend on
their discount factors and are independent from the two outside options, or one of
the two players is kept at his outside option. In the first case the players have an
incentive to invest in increasing their discount factor by making what we call an
investment in patience. In the second case the players have an incentive to manip-
ulate the outside options. More precisely, the player that expects to be kept at his
outside option benefits from increasing his own outside option by making what we
call defensive investments. The other player instead benefits from decreasing the
opponent’s outside option by making what we call offensive investments.
We then explore whether and how wasteful investment can be minimized or even
eliminated by a mediator via an appropriate choice of the bargaining protocol. In
our model, the mediator cannot commit to destroying surplus, and therefore can
only announce bargaining protocols that are efficient both on- and off-equilibrium.
Despite this, we show that the mediator can achieve full efficiency when he either
observes offensive and defensive investments, or he observes the investments in pa-
tience. When offensive and defensive investments are observed, the mediator will
implement a permanent proposer bargaining protocol, in which, in every period,
4 Instead of an explicit announcement, we can equivalently think of established norms or proto-
cols followed by a mediator in case of intervention. In this case, we want to know which norms or
protocols minimize wasteful pre-negotiation investments.
1 Introduction 4
the same player proposes with probability 1 to the other player. This bargaining
protocol eliminates all incentives to invest in patience. Furthermore, by choosing
the probability that each player will be the permanent proposer, the mediator can
determine the share of peace dividend accruing to each player in the equilibrium of
the bargaining game. This share can be manipulated so to compensate for any offen-
sive or defensive investments, hence eliminating the incentives to invest. Similarity,
if the mediator observes the players’ investments in patience, he can implement a
constant random proposer bargaining protocol in which a given player proposes to
the other with constant probability in every period. By varying the probability that
each player makes a proposal in response to the players’ investment in patience, the
mediator can maintain the players on the same utility level independently from their
investments (offensive, defensive or in patience).5
When the mediator cannot observe neither the investments in patience, nor
offensive and defensive investments, he will choose randomly which player is the
permanent proposer so to eliminate investments in patience. The probability that
each player is the permanent proposer determines the share of the peace dividend
accruing to each player. We characterize the waste minimizing sharing rule and show
that it is asymmetric, giving a larger share to the strongest player and inducing the
weakest player not to invest at all, where “weak” and “strong” are defined by the
outcome of the potential conflict in absence of investments.
The intuition is that by choosing the share of surplus accruing to each player, the
mediator determines the sensitivity of each player’s payoff to the two outside options,
and therefore the incentives to manipulate these outside options via offensive and
defensive investments. More precisely, allocating a larger share of surplus to a player
makes both players’ payoffs more strongly dependent on the other player’s outside
option. By favoring the strongest player, the mediator increases the “fight” over the
weak player’s outside option—with the weak player making defensive investments
and the strong player making offensive investments—and decreases the fight over the
strong player’s outside option—with the strong player making defensive investments
and the weak player making offensive investments. In our specification, the mediator
minimizes total waste by inducing the players to fight over the lowest of the two
outside options (that of the weak player), and away from the highest outside option
(that of the strong player). Therefore, there may be a trade off between equity and
5 Interestingly, there is no benefit for the mediator to observing both the investments in patience,
and offensive and defensive investments.
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efficiency: to minimize wasteful, pre-negotiation investment the mediator should be
biased toward the strongest player.
A final point we make is that the mediator may benefit from organizing a conces-
sion game. This game is akin to a tournament in which each player tries to influence
the bargaining protocol by making concessions to the other player—where conces-
sions are visible, costly actions that benefit the opponent. This tournament can help
the mediator because the equilibrium level of concessions is a function of the size of
the peace dividend, which is itself a function of offensive and defensive investments.
Even if the mediator does not observe these investments, he can nonetheless affect
them by designing the concession game appropriately. In particular, we show that
the mediator can construct the concession game so that offensive investments (those
that increase the peace dividend and hence the incentive to make concessions) are
fully eliminated.
Our paper belongs to the literature studying hold-up problems, that is, how to
achieve achieve efficiency (or reduce inefficiencies) when investments are not con-
tractible. The vast majority of papers in this literature, however, assume that the
outside options of the ex-post negotiation can be decided contractually ex-ante in
order to induce the efficient level of investments.6 Here instead we are interested
in situations in which the outside options are determined by the players’ invest-
ments and therefore cannot be specified contractually ex-ante. To the best of our
knowledge, this question has not received much attention before, especially in the
contest of mediation.7 Whereas many papers have noted that the negotiating par-
ties may want to invest before the start of the negotiation, existing economic models
of mediation assume that the mediator’s sole role is to maximize surplus within the
negotiation.8 Introducing pre-negotiation actions changes the role of the mediator,
6 For example, in the seminal work of Grossman and Hart (1986) the allocation of ownership
indirectly determines the players’ outside options in the ex-post negotiation. In Aghion, Dewa-
tripont, and Rey (1994) the players can directly specify ex-ante the outside options of the ex-post
negotiation (together with the surplus share accruing to each player in the ex-post negotiation).
7 There are papers in which the outside options of the ex-post negotiation depend both on the
ex-ante allocation of ownership and on subsequent, non contractible investments (see Edlin and
Reichelstein, 1996, Che and Hausch, 1999, and Chatterjee and Chiu, 2013). A few papers addressed
our exact research question but in a specific environment: a network of buyers and sellers, in which
each player can spend resources to link with an additional buyer/seller and therefore increase his
bargaining power (see Kranton and Minehart, 2000, Kranton and Minehart, 2001 and Elliott,
2015).
8 See the review by Jackson and Morelli (2011) on the different reasons why bargaining failures
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because maximizing surplus requires considering also how the mediator can affect
pre-negotiation wasteful investments.9
A second point of departure from the economic literature on mediation is that,
in our model, the mediator can influence the negotiating outcome but may not be
able to fully determine it.10 The existing models of mediation instead typically
assumes that the mediator can only make incentive compatible recommendations to
the players (as in the seminal work by Myerson, 1986) and contrasts the role of the
mediator with that of an arbitrator who has the power to impose an outcome on the
players. Scholars in political science and international relationship instead propose
a more nuanced view on the ability of third parties to determine the outcome of
a negotiation. Our modelling choice is close to Fisher (2012)’s power mediation in
which the mediator has some power over the outcome of the mediation but cannot
fully determine it (as opposed to an arbitrator).11
The paper that is closest to ours is Meirowitz, Morelli, Ramsay, and Squintani
(forthcoming), who also study the role of the mediator in reducing pre-negotiation
wasteful investments. They compare mediated and unmediated negotiation and
argue that mediated negotiation generates lower pre-negotiation wasteful invest-
ment in arms. In their framework, due to informational asymmetries inefficient
negotiation breakdowns may occur. The mediator’s role is to regulate the flow of
information among parties, so to maximize the probability that an efficient settle-
ment is reached. By doing so, he also determines the precision of each player’s belief
relative to the other player’s strength and the incentives to modify this strength via
and an inefficient war may occur. Recent papers that explore the role of third party intervention
in reducing the probability of an inefficient breakdown of the negotiations are Goltsman, Hörner,
Pavlov, and Squintani (2009), Hörner, Morelli, and Squintani (2015), Balzer and Schneider (2015).
Recent papers that explore the role of third party intervention in reducing the time required to
reach an agreement are Fanning (2016) and Basak (2017), who model the negotiation as a war of
attrition.
9 An exception is Baliga and Sjöström (2004), who study how a negotiation (modeled as a
cheap-talk stage) can reduce subsequent inefficient investments.
10 This will happen whenever the mediator is less informed than the two players.
11 Because, in our model, the mediator regulates the flow of offers between players, we establish
an interesting connection between what Fisher (2012) calls conciliation, that is, the role of the
mediator in establishing a communication link between the players, and power mediation. See also
a similar taxonomy by Bercovitch (1997), who distinguishes between a mediator’s communication
strategies (i.e., transmitting messages) and manipulative strategies (i.e., influencing the outcome
of the negotiation).
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a pre-bargaining investment. His effect on the players pre-bargaining investment
is, therefore, indirect and unintentional. Hence, our model differs from Meirowitz
et al. (forthcoming) in one fundamental aspect: the mediator’s goal is to achieve
efficiency, which explicitly includes reducing wasteful pre-negotiation investments.12
A number of other authors also noted that the way the negotiation is conducted
can affect pre-negotiation actions by the players. Both Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner
(2015) and Garfinkel, McBride, and Skaperdas (2012) show that the surplus share
accruing to each player can have an effect on decisions made prior to the beginning
of the negotiation. In Esteban et al. (2015) the surplus share obtained by each party
in a negotiation may affect the intensity of the pre-negotiation conflict. They show
that an equal surplus-split rule may be welfare decreasing relative to an asymmetric
surplus-split rule. Garfinkel et al. (2012) notice that by investing in arms play-
ers influence the probability of winning in a conflict—and hence the disagreement
point—and the share of surplus in the case of a peaceful agreement. Their main
result is that when fighting is not sufficiently destructive, arming will be unavoid-
able within the class of distribution rules they consider. Also related is the model
in Anbarci, Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (2002), where each party starts by making
wasteful investments in armaments. The paper compares the waste produced by
three cooperative bargaining solutions: equal sacrifice, equal benefit, and Kalai-
Smorodinski. The main result is that if players are symmetric equal sacrifice is the
solution generating the lowest waste. Our contribution with respect to these papers
is to study the full problem of a mediator who wishes to minimize pre-negotiation
wasteful investments, including the informational constraints he may face.
Finally, our paper contributes to an important debate in political science and
international relations regarding the merits of biased mediation (see Svensson, 2014
for a review). This literature argues that a mediator who is biased may be more
likely to achieve an agreement, where “bias” typically refers to a distortion in the
mediator’s preferences. For example, in Kydd (2003) a bargaining party is more
likely to believe the information transmitted by a mediator if the mediator is biased
in favor of this party. In our paper, the mediator is, in principle, unbiased because
12 Our models are complementary in two additional aspects. One is that they assume that the
bargaining players are ex-ante identical, while our paper is mostly concerned with how ex-ante
differences affect the optimal negotiation procedure. The second difference is in the treatment of
information. We assume that players have complete information while they assume asymmetry of
information among players.
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his goal is to maximize welfare. However, if the players are asymmetric in the cost or
the benefit of making pre-negotiation investments, he may choose to be strategically
biased in order to decrease total waste. Hence, here bias is an equilibrium outcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the model. Section 3 solves the model for the case in which the mediator is absent.
Section 4 introduces the mediator. Section 5 considers some extensions to the model.
In particular, Section 5.3 allows the mediator to organize a pre-negotiation contest
over the bargaining protocol. The last section concludes. Unless otherwise noted,
all proofs are in Appendix.
2 The model
A total payoff S is to be shared between two players, 1 and 2, initially characterized
by their ex-ante power levels φ1 and φ2. The players negotiate on how to split S,
but if they fail to find an agreement a conflict will arise.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the game each player can make
investments aimed at shifting the payoffs in case of conflict. We consider two kinds
of such investments: offensive and defensive. Next, and just before the negotiation
starts, the players make investments in patience: actions aimed at reducing the cost
of extending the length of the negotiation. Finally, the negotiation starts. If there
is no mediator, the negotiation is a bargaining game in alternating offers. If there is
a mediator, the mediator will choose the bargaining protocol: the probability that
each player makes an offer to the other player in every period of the negotiation.
The mediator announces the bargaining protocol at the beginning of the game, and
this announcement is fully incorporated into the players’ investment choices. Figure
1 summarizes the timing of the game.
The outside option: conflict
The payoff in the Nash equilibrium of the conflict game are determined by the
players’ initial power levels φ1 and φ2, and by the players’ offensive and defensive
investments.13
A player’s initial power level φi is the payoff achieved by this player in the conflict
13 We call it “conflict game” because, in case conflict is triggered, the players may take additional
costly actions, such as effort, giving rise to a game.
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game in case no investment is made. This payoff may depend on natural elements
(e.g. the presence of mountains may make one country harder to attack) or by the
merit of the legal dispute. It may also depend on prior investments. The conflict
payoffs can be manipulated by the players’ offensive oi and defensive investments di.
By investing in oi player i decreases player −i’s payoff in the conflict game, while
by investing di player i can increase his own payoff in the conflict game.
As examples of offensive investment, a player may purchase ballistic missiles or
collect evidence against the opponent to be used in a court case. As examples of
defensive investments, a player may purchase antimissile system and bunkers, or
move assets to jurisdictions where they are harder to seize in case the outcome of
a lawsuit is negative. In the case of industrial conflict, a firm may invest resources
to make the relocation of the factory a credible threat, which should be considered
“offensive.” These investments can also be interpreted as pre-bargaining costly ac-
tions aimed at appropriating part of the surplus. For example, before the start of
a negotiation over a territorial dispute, a country may invade part of the disputed
territory. This costly action is formally identical to a defensive investment because
it increases the payoff of the invading party in case of breakdown of the negotiation
over the allocation of the remaining territory. Similarly, an offensive investment is
a costly action that transforms a territory formerly in the hands of a given country
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into a contested area to be allocated via a negotiation.14
An important caveat is that many investments are simultaneously offensive and
defensive, in the sense that they simultaneously increase a player’s utility and de-
crease the opponents utility in case of conflict (for example, hiring a very expensive
but competent lawyer or purchasing tanks). Some other investments decrease both
players utilities in case of conflicts, and are therefore mutually offensive (for ex-
ample, nuclear weapons). Whether an investment is offensive, defensive (or both)
depends also on the details of the conflict game.15 But in any model of conflict,
any type of investment can be expressed as a combination of offensive and defensive
investments based on its effect on the players’ payoffs in the Nash equilibrium of
the conflict game. As a first approximation here we only consider purely offensive
or purely defensive investments.
Let us denote by ui the payoff of player i in the conflict game, taking into account
her ex-ante power φi, own defensive investment di and the opponent’s offensive
investment o−i, that is, ui = u(φi, di, o−i). We specify this payoff function to
u(φi, di, o−i) ≡ φie−oj(2− e−di), i, j = 1, 2.
The key feature of this expression is weak separability: the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between di and φi is independent of o−i and the one between o−i and φi
is independent of di. This implies that the rate at which player i can compensate
for being weak ex-ante (i.e., having low φi) by making an investment in defense is
independent on o−i. Similarly, the rate at which player i can compensate for player
−i being strong ex-ante (i.e., having high φ−i) by making an investment in offense
is independent on d−i. This key feature is justified by the fact that φi can be the
result of investments in offensive and defensive technology made in prior periods,
the marginal effect of which should not depend on the current level of investments.16
14 We thank Attila Ambrus for suggesting this interpretation.
15 For example, in Dixit (1987) players pre-commit effort before entering a contest. He shows that
the strongest player (the one with a higher probability of winning) may want to pre-commit effort
above the one-shot Nash equilibrium level. Once the contest is reached, the strongest player will
exert no additional effort, while the other player will set effort below the one-shot Nash equilibrium
level. In this case, the pre-commitment of effort can be a form of ”mutually defensive” investment
because it reduces effort during the conflict and therefore may increase both players’ payoff in case
the conflict is reached. Instead, in a war of attrition, some investments may increase the length of
a conflict and therefore be mutually destructive.
16 One can alternatively assume that the marginal rate of substitution between di and φi is
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Clearly, weak separability is satisfied if and only if ui = ψ[f(φi)g(di)h(o−i)]. Our
assumed payoff function is a member of this class that we use for the sake of conve-
nience, as it yields tractable closed forms. The marginal cost of investing in defensive
and offensive technology are cd and co, assumed constant.
Note that, if the players expect no negotiation to occur –and hence invest solely
in view of influencing the payoff of the conflict game– their offensive investment will
be zero and hence the joint payoff is
max
d1
{u(φ1, d1, 0)− cd · d1}+ max
d2
{u(φ2, d2, 0)− cd · d2} .
there is a role for a mediator only when sharing S in a negotiation dominates the
conflict payoff. Otherwise, the players will never reach the negotiation stage. There-
fore, throughout the paper maintain the assumption that
S ≥ max
d1
{u(φ1, d1, 0)− cd · d1}+ max
d2
{u(φ2, d2, 0)− cd · d2} (A1)
Investing in patience.
After setting offensive and defensive investments the players can invest in patience.
Call β̄i ∈ (0, 1) the players’ initial discount factor. Each player can increase his
discount factor to any βi ∈ [β̄i, β̂] at a cost c(βi − β̄i), where 0 < β̄1, β̄2 < β̂ < 1.
We assume that limx→0 c′(x) = 0 so that the investment in patience will be strictly
positive whenever a player’s payoff depends on his/her discount factor.
Investing in patience should be interpreted as taking costly actions that decrease
the cost of protracting the negotiation. As already discussed in the Introduction, a
famous example is the two-year lease for a house payed by the Vietnamese delegation
at the beginning of the Paris negotiations to end the Vietnam war. After the lease
was payed, the marginal cost of protracting the negotiation was greatly reduced
because the cost of housing was sunk. Similarly, unions routinely set up resistance
funds to support striking workers, and hence reduce the cost of protracting the
negotiation (and the corresponding industrial action).
a function of o−i. But then o−i should affect the relative benefit not only of current defensive
investments, but also of past defensive investments. It follows that φi should be a function of the
investments o−i and di, a complication that we wish to avoid. Note also that our specification
abstracts away issues related to risk, that are not central to our analysis.
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The negotiation.
After all investments are made, the players negotiate over how to split the ex-post
surplus (also called “peace dividend”):
S − u1 − u2,
which is always positive because of (A1). We model the negotiation as an infinite-
horizon bargaining game.17 Absent the mediator, the bargaining game is one of
alternating offers: in every period one player makes an offer and the other player
can accept, reject and move to the next period, or reject and trigger a conflict.
If the negotiation is mediated by a third party, the mediator will decide who pro-
poses in each period. Hence, the mediator here is an independent agent with some
enforcement power –such as a large country, an international organization or an
international court– who can coerce players into respecting a specific bargaining
protocol.18




where pi,t is the probability that player i ∈ {1, 2} makes an offer in period t, also
called recognition probability. We rule out simultaneous offers, so that p1,t ≤ 1−p2,t.19
For example, a bargaining protocol of the form
{1, 0, 1, 0, ...}
17 Note that we do not allow the players to make further investments once the negotiation has
started. We consider this possibility in Section 5.2, where we argue that our results remain quali-
tatively unchanged.
18 The negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC provide a good example.
They have taken place in Cuba because the assumed leverage of this government on the FARC.
In Germany, for many years the negotiations between unions and employers have been chaired by
the government because its leverage on the parties.
19 It is well known that if simultaneous offers are possible then the bargaining game may have
multiple equilibria, some of them inefficient. For example, Chatterjee and Samuelson (1990) con-
sider an infinitely-repeated bargaining game in which players can make simultaneous offers and
show that the set of perfect equilibria consists of every possible individually rational outcome. We
assume later that the mediator cannot commit to destroying welfare, and hence will not allow
simultaneous offers if he expects the resulting equilibrium to be inefficient.
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{0, 1, 0, 1, ...}
corresponds a game or alternating offers. We call a bargaining protocol of the form
{p, p, p, ..., }
{q, q, q, ..., }
with q ≤ 1 − p a bargaining protocol with constant recognition probability. Fur-
thermore, any correlation between probability of proposing at different periods is
possible. For example, in the bargaining protocol
{p1,1, p1,2, ...}, {p2,1, p2,2, ...} =
{1, 1, ...}, {0, 0, ...} with probability γ{0, 0, ...}, {1, 1, ...} with probability 1− γ
the probabilities of proposing in each period are perfectly correlated. We call such
bargaining protocol random permanent proposer.
Information structure
We assume that the two players are fully informed: they observe the power levels φ1
and φ2, the total payoff to be shared S, both players’ offensive and defensive invest-
ments, both players’ investment in patience and the resulting discount factors. We
therefore abstract away from the usual role of the mediator as a filter of the infor-
mation flow between the two players, and only focus on his role in determining the
order of offers. We will analyze the mediator’s problem under different assumptions
regarding what the mediator can observe.
The mediator
We assume that the mediator is benevolent: his objective is to maximize welfare.
However, the mediator lacks commitment, which implies that the only bargaining
protocols that he can credibly implement are those that maximize welfare at every
stage of the game, both on and off equilibrium.
This implies that the mediator will always choose bargaining protocols of the
form pi,t ≡ pt and p2,t = 1 − pt, so that costly delays in reaching an agreement are
avoided. Among bargaining protocols of that form, the mediator will choose the
bargaining protocol that is ex-post efficient, that is, that minimizes the investment
in patience.
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It follows that the solution to the mediator’s problem will be the bargaining
protocol that minimize expenditure in offensive and defensive technology, co(o1 +
o2)+cd(d1+d2), under the constraint that the bargaining protocol chosen must have
the form pi,t ≡ pt and p2,t = 1− pt and be ex-post efficient. Depending on what the
mediator can observe, the bargaining protocol {p1, p2, p3, ...} can be contingent on
the initial power φ1 and φ2, and/or on the investments made by each player.
3 Bargaining without the mediator.
Suppose the mediator is absent and the bargaining game is in alternating offers. If
we take the discount factors β1, β2 and the outside options u1, u2 as given, the game
is fairly standard and is discussed, for example, in Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton
(1989).20 Call v1 ≥ u1 and v2 ≥ u2 the players’ utilities in equilibrium. Because
the game is stationary, v1 and v2 are also the players utilities in case period 3 of the
game is reached. Suppose period 2 of the negotiation is reached and player 2 makes
an offer to player 1. After receiving player 2’s offer, player 1 has three options:
accept the offer, reject and trigger a conflict so as to earn u1, or reject and continue
the negotiation so as to earn β1v1. It follows that player 2’s offer will be equal to
max{β1v1, u1}. Hence, if period 2 of the negotiation is reached, player 2’s utility is
S − max{β1v1, u1}. Consider now period 1. For the same logic, player 1 will offer
max{β2(S −max{β1v1, u1}), u2} and player 2 will accept. The equilibrium payoffs
therefore solve
v2 = max{β2(S −max{β1v1, u1}), u2}










v2 =S − v1.
See Figure 2 for an illustration. There are therefore two relevant cases to con-
sider: the case in which the equilibrium payoffs are determined by the discount
20 The only difference is that, here, the two players may have different discount factors.







U2 = S · β2(1−β1)1−β1β2







U2 = S − u1
Fig. 2: Solution to the negotiation without the mediator for different values of u1.
factors, and the case in which the equilibrium payoffs are determined by one of the
two outside options.21 In each case, the players have the incentive to make wasteful
pre-negotiation investments. Suppose that, absent any investment in patience, we








> u1 v2 = S − v1 > u2.
In this case, the marginal benefit of an arbitrarily small investment in patience is
strictly positive, while its marginal cost is zero. It follows that, in equilibrium both
players will invest in patience.
Suppose instead that, absent any investment in patience, the solution is such

















> S − u2
21 Of course, there is also a limit case in which the equilibrium payoffs are determined by the
discount factors, but at the same time one of the two equilibrium payoffs is equal to one of the
options. For ease of exposition we ignore this case.
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In this case, the player kept at his outside option can increase his payoff by making
a defensive investment, while the other player can increase his payoff by making an




|di=0 = φieo−i > cd
Similarly, player −i will set positive offensive investment whenever:
∂ui(φi, di, o−i)
o−i
|o−i=0 = φi(2− edi) > co.
If ether co and cd are sufficiently small, one of the two players will want to invest.
The bottom line is that the solution to the negotiation is either determined by
the discount factors or is determined by the outside options. In one case, the two
players will have an incentive to invest in patience, while in the other case they have
an incentive to manipulate their outside options by making offensive and defensive
investments. The following proposition summarizes these observations and also
provides a proof of the existence of the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Assume, without loss of generality, that φ1 > φ2. Whenever φ2 >
min{co, cd} then the equilibrium is inefficient (if multiple equilibria exist, then all
equilibria are inefficient).
Note that the conditions described in the above proposition are sufficient but by
no mean necessary in order for an inefficient equilibrium to emerge.
It is also possible to characterize when there will be investment in patience or
investment in manipulating the outside options. If S is sufficiently large, then for
any {u1, u2} the solution will be independent from the two outside options and the
players will invest in patience with probability 1. If instead S is sufficiently small,
one of the two outside options will be binding, and therefore the players may make
offensive and defensive investments. The composition of the investment therefore
depends on the size of the peace dividend.
4 Mediation in the shadow of conflict
We now introduce the mediator. As already discussed, the mediator cannot commit
to destroying welfare. The only credible announcements are therefore bargaining
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protocols that minimize waste ex-post, that is, after the offensive and defensive
investments are set. We therefore start by deriving the set of ex-post efficient bar-
gaining protocols. We then analyze the full waste-minimization problem.
4.1 Ex-post efficient bargaining protocol.
We split the analysis in two cases, depending on whether or not the bargaining
protocol can be contingent on the investment in patience.
Non-contingent bargaining protocol Suppose that the mediator announces that
one of the two players will be a permanent proposer: he will propose with probability
one in every period. In this case, in the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE), an agreement is reached immediately and the proposer earns the entire
surplus.
It follows that by announcing that player 1 will be the permanent proposer with
probability γ ∈ [0, 1], the mediator can allocate a share γ of the ex-post surplus to
player 1, independently from the players discount factors. This protocol eliminates
the incentives to invest in patience and hence achieves ex-post efficiency. The next
lemma shows that if the bargaining protocol cannot be contingent on the investment
in patience, then all bargaining protocols that achieve ex-post efficiency must be
payoff-equivalent to random permanent proposer.22
Lemma 1. Suppose the bargaining protocol cannot be contingent on the investment
in patience. Then all ex-post efficient bargaining protocols are payoff-equivalent to
the random permanent proposer.
Given that the negotiator will choose an ex-post efficient bargaining protocol,
the players’ payoffs are
U1 = u1 + γ (S − u1 − u2) , and U2 = u2 + (1− γ) (S − u1 − u2) ,
22 Clearly the following lemma relies on the players’ risk neutrality. Because randomizing who is
the permanent proposer exposes the bargaining parties to risk, if the players are risk-averse, the
mediator may instead announce a fixed probability of proposing in each period, or transform the
game into one of alternating offers. Studying how the mediator should solve the tradeoff between
reducing the investments in becoming more patient and reducing players’ exposure to risk is left
for future work.
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where γ is the probability of player 1 being the permanent proposer, which is also
the share of the peace dividend accruing to each player (see Figure 3). Notice that
by choosing the sharing rule the mediator can determine {U1, U2} only if he observes
u1 and u2, and S. When this is the case, the mediator’s role is similar to that of an
arbitrator. For most of the paper we will instead assume that the outside options
ui and S are not known by the mediator, who is therefore an outsider knowing less
about the dispute than the players. In this case, under a random permanent proposer
bargaining protocol, the players’ payoffs will depend both on the probability of being
the permanent proposer and on the players’ actions.
Finally, remember that there is a one-to-one relationship between the share of
surplus accruing to each player in the negotiation and the weight attached to a
player’s utility in a Generalized Nash Bargaining (GNB) problem. Hence, equiva-
lently, we can think of the set of non-contingent ex-post efficient bargaining protocols
as those leading to a bargaining solution that satisfies Pareto optimality, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, invariance to rescaling of utility (which are the




















Fig. 3: Solution to the negotiation for given γ
4 Mediation in the shadow of conflict 19
Contingent bargaining protocol Suppose instead that the bargaining protocol
can be made contingent on the investment in patience. Consider a bargaining pro-
tocol with constant recognition probability p. Call v1 ≥ φ1 and v2 ≥ φ2 the players’
utilities in equilibrium. Because the game is stationary, v1 and v2 are also the
players’ utilities in case any period of the negotiation is reached.
Assume that player 1 makes an offer in period 1. His offer will be such that
player 2 is indifferent between accepting the offer, and either going to the following
period and earning v2 or triggering a conflict immediately. The players’ utilities are
S −max{β2v2, u2} max{β2v2, u2}
Similarly, if player 2 proposes, the players’ utilities are
max{β1v1, u1} S −max{β1v1, u1}
It follows that the equilibrium payoffs solve
v1 = p (S −max{β2v2, u2}) + (1− p) max{β1v1, u1}
v1 = (1− p) (S −max{β1v1, u1}) + pmax{β2v2, u2}
Solving for v1 and v2 we get:23
v1 =

S − u2 if S
p(1−β2)




τ · S otherwise,






See Figure 4 for an illustration. Note that τ can achieve any value between 0 and
1 (included) as a function of p for any β1, β2. That is, for any β1, β2, by adjusting
the recognition probability the mediator can share the total surplus S in any way
that satisfies the players’ outside options. These observations lead to the following
lemma.
23 These derivations are adapted from Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989), who consider a
bargaining game that is identical to the one presented here, except that they assume alternating
offers while here we have a constant recognition probability.











Fig. 4: Solution to the negotiation for given τ
Lemma 2. Suppose the bargaining protocol can be contingent on the investment in
patience. The mediator can always specify v1 and v2(= S−v1) such that the players’
payoffs are:
min{max{v1, u1}, S − u2} and S −min{max{v1, u1}, S − u2}
independently from their investments in patience. It follows that players do not
invest in patience.
Proof. In the text.
The lemma is based on the fact that, for any τ ∈ [0, 1], by announcing that
p =
τ
τ + (1− τ)1−β1
1−β2
.
the mediator can completely offset any investment in patience and maintain the
utility achieved by both players constant. This eliminates all incentives to invest
in patience and achieves ex-post efficiency. Similarly, any bargaining protocol with
constant recognition probability given by the above expression but with τ drawn at
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random before the start of the negotiation is ex-post efficient. This last observation
implies that random permanent proposer is ex-post efficient here as well.24
4.2 The mediator’s problem
We can now consider the mediator’s problem: among the bargaining protocols that
are ex-post efficient, choose the one that minimizes the expenditure in offensive and
defensive investments. We split our analysis in different cases, depending on what
the mediator can observe.
4.2.1 Observable investments
Suppose that the mediator can credibly announce that each player will be kept at
a specific utility profile v1 and v2 = S − v1, independently from their investments.
Given this announcement, there is an equilibrium in which utilities are v1 and v2 =
S−v1 and there are no investments whenever no level of defensive investment delivers
higher payoff to either player, that is whenever:
u1 ≥ max
d1
{u(φ1, d1, 0)− cd · d1} (1)
S − u1 ≥ max
d2
{u(φ2, d2, 0)− cd · d2} (2)
Note also that when either (1) or (2) are violated at some v1 and v2 = S − v1, then
it is not possible to implement v1 and v2 and have no investment in equilibrium.
The reason is that maxdi {u(φi, di, 0)− cd · di} is the harshest punishment that the
mediator can impose on player i in case of deviation from the equilibrium. (1) or
(2) are therefore necessary and sufficient in order to achieve efficiency.
By condition (A1), the set of utility profiles that achieves zero investment is non





{u(φ1, d1, 0)− cdd1} , S −max
d2
{u(φ2, d2, 0)− cdd2}
]
.
24 Note that there may be other bargaining protocols that achieve ex-post efficiency. The next
section will make clear that, when it comes to minimizing offensive and defensive investments,
focusing on constant recognition bargaining protocols that achieve a specific τ is without loss of
generality.
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That is, if the mediator’s announcement is credible, there always is a utility profile
{u1, S − u1} that achieves full efficiency.
The question we turn next is whether the mediator can impose a specific util-
ity profile on the players. Suppose the mediator can observe the investments in
patience but not offensive and defensive investments. By Lemma 2, if no offensive
nor defensive investments were made, the mediator can impose any utility pro-
file u1 ∈ [φ1, S − φ2] and u2 = S − u1 and achieve ex-post efficiency. Because
φi ≤ maxdi {u(φi, di, 0)− cddi}, then the set of utility profiles that satisfies (1) and
(2) can always be achieved via an appropriate bargaining protocol contingent on the
players’ investment in patience.25 Hence, offensive and defensive investments can be
fully eliminated.
Suppose instead that the mediator can observe offensive and defensive invest-
ments but not the investment in patience. The ex-post efficient bargaining protocol
is random permanent proposer, in which the mediator allocates a fraction γ of the
peace dividend to player 1 and the rest to player 2. Conditions (1) and (2) become:
φ1 + γ(S − φ1 − φ2) ≥ max
d1
{u(φ1, d1, 0)− cdd1} (3)
φ2 + (1− γ)(S − φ1 − φ2) ≥ max
d2
{u(φ2, d2, 0)− cdd2} (4)
It is immediate that for any u1 that satisfies (1) and (2) there exists a γ that
satisfies (3) and (4). That is, choosing the players’ utility profile or choosing the
share of ex-post surplus are completely equivalent whenever the investments (and
therefore the outside options u1 and u2) are observed by the mediator. The fact
that there exists a u1 that satisfies (1) and (2) therefore implies that there exists a
γ that satisfies (3) and (4) and that eliminates all incentives to make offensive and
defensive investments.
The following proposition summarizes the observations already made in the text.
Proposition 2. When either the investment in patience or offensive and defensive
investments are observable by the mediator, the mediator can always achieve full
efficiency.
Proof. In the text.
25 Going back to Lemma 2, this also implies that considering exclusively bargaining protocols
with constant recognition probabilities is without loss of generality
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Note also that all utility profiles that satisfy (1) and (2) (and are therefore
consistent with efficiency) can be achieved both when the investment in patience
is observable (but not offensive and defensive investments) and when offensive and
defensive investments are observable (but not the investment in patience). There is
no additional gain from observing everything (that is, offensive investment, defensive
investments, and investments in patience) because the set of utility profiles that
can be implemented are again given by (1) and (2). This observation implies the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. There set of outcomes that the mediator can implement under full
information is the same as when only the investment in patience is observable (or
only offensive and defensive investments are observable).
We now turn to characterizing the set of utility profiles that the mediator can
implement while achieving efficiency, and argue that a trade off between equity and






















S − φ1 − φ2

The question we are after is whether 1/2 is an element of the above set, that is,
whether the mediator can eliminate all investment and be fair at the same time.













S − φ1 − φ2
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Hence, the tradeoff between efficiency and fairness is more likely to emerge when-
ever the cost cd is small, S is small, or φ2 is large. The reason is that a small S or a
large φ2 reduce the ex-post surplus to be shared in the negotiation and the benefit
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for player 1 of accepting γ = 1
2
rather than deviating. This tradeoff is also more
likely to emerge whenever φ1 is large. Again, as φ1 increases the ex-post surplus de-
creases. Furthermore, φ1 large also increases the benefit for player 2 to deviate and
make a large defensive investment. When this tradeoff emerges, the mediator needs
to set γ > 1/2 in order to eliminate the incentives to invest and be biased in favor
of player 1, who is the strongest player and therefore has the strongest incentive to
deviate. The following Corollary summarizes these observations.
Corollary 2. Suppose that either the investment in patience or offensive and de-
fensive investments are observable by the mediator. If the distribution of power is
uneven, the mediator must be biased toward the strongest player. When the distri-
bution of power is sufficiently even, the mediator can eliminate all waste and at the
same time be fair.
4.2.2 Unobservable investments
Suppose the mediator does not observe neither offensive investments, nor defensive
investments, nor investments in patience.26 In this case, the only ex-post efficient
bargaining protocol is random permanent proposer, in which a share of the peace
dividend γ is allocated to player 1, with the rest allocated to player 2. The media-
tor’s problem is choosing γ such that the pre-negotiation wasteful investments are
minimized.






−o2(2− e−d1) + γ
[
S − φ1e−o2(2− e−d1)− φ2e−o1(2− e−d2)
]}





−o1(2− e−d2) + (1− γ)
[
S − φ1e−o2(2− e−d1)− φ2e−o1(2− e−d2)
]}
− coo2 − cdd2.
26 Because the players observe each other’s investments, the mediator may try to elicit this
information from them. Note, however, that in case the players’ reports on the investment levels
do not match (so that at least one of the two players is lying), the mediator is unable to punish
both players at the same time. The reason is that the mediator cannot commit to destroying
surplus ex-post. Hence, if one player is punished by receiving a low surplus share, the other player
must be rewarded. It follows that there is no equilibrium in which the players report truthfully.
We do, however, show in Section 5.3 that the mediator may benefit from announcing that the
bargaining protocol will depend on some costly actions taken by the players.
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In this case, the four best responses are








≥ 1 else o1 = 0, (5)








≥ 1 else d1 = 0, (6)








≥ 1 else o2 = 0,
(7)










≥ 1 else d2 = 0. (8)
Hence o1(φ2, d2, γ) and d2(φ2, o1, γ) are both increasing in γ, while o2(φ1, d1, γ) and
d1(φ1, o2, γ) are both decreasing in γ. Intuitively, as the share of ex-post surplus
received increases, a player’s payoff depends more and more on the opponent’s out-
side option rather than on his own outside option. In the limit case in which all
ex-post surplus is allocated to player i, the final payoff for both players only de-
pends on player −i’s outside option. As a consequence, the incentive to degrade
the opponent and make an offensive investment increases with the share of ex-post
surplus received. Similarly, as the share of ex-post surplus received decreases, a
player’s payoff depends more and more on his own outside option rather than on
his opponent’s. It follows that, as the share of ex-post surplus received decreases,
the incentive to make a defensive investment increases. See Figures 5 and 6 for an
illustration.
Note that o1(φ2, d2, γ) and d2(φ2, o1, γ) are best response of each other, and
o2(φ1, d1, γ) and d1(φ1, o2, γ) are best responses to each other. There are therefore
two separate games. The first one is a “fight over player 2’s outside option” in which
player 1 makes an offensive investment and player 2 makes a defensive investment.
In this game, the two best responses are increasing in γ. The other game is a “fight
over player 1’s outside option” in which player 1 makes a defensive investment and
player 2 makes an offensive investment. In this game, the two best responses are
decreasing in γ. Putting the best responses together, we can characterize the Nash
equilibrium of the game:
Lemma 3. The Nash equilibrium of the game is as follows:








































Fig. 5: Benefit of player 1’s offensive investment for different values of γ.
and d1 = d2 = 0.
• If co > cd,
– for (o1, d2)
∗ for γ ≥ co+cd
2φ2













≤ γ ≤ co+cd
2φ2






∗ for γ < cd
φ2
, we have o1 = 0 and d2 = 0.
– for (d1, o2)
∗ for 1− γ ≥ co+cd
2φ1
































Fig. 6: Benefit of player 1’s defensive investment for different values of γ.
∗ for cd
φ1
≤ 1− γ ≤ co+cd
2φ1






∗ for 1− γ < cd
φ1
, we have o2 = 0 and d1 = 0.
The Nash equilibrium depends on the cost of offensive and defensive investments.
When cd ≥ co, in equilibrium there never is any investment in defensive technology.
Remember that defensive investment is decreasing in offensive investment. When
the cost of offensive investment is low relative to the cost of defensive investment,
each player will make a large investment in offensive technology and, in equilibrium,
drive the incentive to invest in defensive technology of the other player to zero.




player invests only in offensive technology while the other invests only in defensive
technology. Instead, for intermediate sharing rules, players only make defensive in-
vestments and no offensive investments.27 Intuitively, because of the cost advantage,
players are more likely to make a defensive investment, the more so the larger the
share of ex-post surplus going to the other player. However, the offensive investment
made by player i increases with the defensive investment made by player −i, which
implies that for extreme sharing rules one player makes a defensive investment while
the other player makes an offensive investment.
27 The reader may wonder why a player may make a defensive investment when the other player
is not making any offensive investment. To understand this, remember that players may have
made offensive or defensive investments before the game start. These investments are embedded
into the initial power levels φ1 and φ2. Hence, the result here is that, for intermediate sharing rule
players make additional defensive investment but no additional offensive investment.
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The Nash equilibrium also depends on γ. Suppose the mediator allocates most
of the ex-post surplus to player 2 by setting γ close to zero. Depending on co and
cd, Player 1 may make positive defensive investment but no offensive investment.
Player 2 will make a positive offensive investment and no defensive investment. As
γ increases, the players substitute one type of investment with the other. For γ close
to one, the situation is reversed, with Player 1 making only an offensive investment,
and Player 2 possibly only a defensive investment. The key observation is that the
choice of γ determines whether the fight will be over Player 1’s outside option (with
Player 2 attacking it and Player 1 defending it) or over Player 2’s outside option
(with Player 1 attacking it and Player 2 defending it). The following proposition















drives wasteful investment to zero. Whenever (9) is violated, the mediator minimizes
waste by setting
γ? = 1− min{co, cd}
φ1
.
At the waste-minimizing γ player 2’s offensive investment and player 1’s defen-
sive investments are zero. If co ≤ cd player 1’s offensive investment is positive but
player 2’s defensive investment is zero. If cd < co, player 2’s defensive investment
is positive.
Condition (9) implies that, for given φ1 + φ2, the distribution of initial power is
sufficiently uneven. In this case, the mediator can completely eliminate the players’
incentives to invest. Instead, whenever the distribution of initial power levels is
sufficiently equal so that (9) is violated, the mediator is unable to eliminate waste-
ful investment. As we discussed earlier, the choice of the sharing rule determines
whether the fight is over player 1 or player 2 outside option. The proposition shows
that total waste is minimized when the mediator sets γ? = 1− min{co,cd}
φ1
, which is the
sharing rule that eliminates the fight over player 1’s outside option. This sharing
rule may generate a fight over player 2’s outside option. However, because of the
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difference in initial power levels, player 1’s incentive to perform offensive investment
is lower than player 2, and the opposite holds for the incentives to perform defensive
investments. Hence, total waste is minimized when the fight is over player 2’s out-
side option, with player 1 attacking and player 2 defending, rather than player 1’s
outside option. That is, the mediator directs the fight away from the largest outside
option, toward the smallest outside option.
If the distribution of power is uneven so that 9 holds, γ? = 1
2
eliminates all
investments if and only if φ1 ≤ 2 min{co, cd}. If instead (9) is violated simple
algebra shows that γ? is greater than 1/2. Hence, there is no trade off between
fairness and efficiency if and only if φ1 ≤ 2 min{co, cd}. In this case, both players’
initial power levels are low (remember that φ2 ≤ φ1), and the incentives to invest
of both players are also low. If instead φ1 > 2 min{co, cd} fairness and efficiency
are mutually exclusive, and the mediator minimizes waste by favoring the strongest
player.28
5 Extensions
5.1 When the mediator is completely uninformed.
An interesting question is how the mediator’s problem changes when he is completely
uninformed, that is, he does not observe neither the investment levels, nor the ex-
ante power levels, nor S.29 In this section we answer this question for the case
co ≤ cd, and for the a specific distribution of the mediator’s belief over φ1 and φ2
(Pareto).
For given γ, the optimal investments by each player are the same as derived in
Section 4.2.2. It follows that, for a given belief over the distribution of ex-ante power



































28 Contrary to the case of observable investments (Section 4.2.1), here S and φ2 play no role in
determining the emergence of the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency. The reason is that, here,
the sharing rule does not change with the investments made by the players. Hence, the benefit
of shifting a player’s outside option depends only on γ and is independent from the other player’s
outside option or the total payoff S. When the sharing rule reacts to the investment as in Section
4.2.1, instead, the size of the ex-post surplus is a relevant element in determining the existence of
the tradeoff.
29 We maintain that (A1) holds for every realization of φ1 and φ2 and S.
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That is, the mediator minimizes each player’s probability of investing times the
level of investment in case a player invests. The mediator’s objective function can
be written explicitly whenever φ1 and φ2 are drawn from two Pareto distributions.
Lemma 4. Assume that φ1 and φ2 are drawn from two Pareto distributions with
parameters κ1 > 0 and κ2 > 0, and minimum values φ1 > 0 and φ2 > 0 respectively.













































































































. As the parameters κ1 and
κ2 increase, the masses of the two distributions become more and more concentrated
near their minimum value. It follows that for κ1 and κ2 arbitrarily large, the medi-
ator’s problem converges to the one studied in the previous section. On the other
hand, as the parameters κ1 and κ2 decrease, the tails of the two Pareto distributions
become thicker, with higher φi becoming more likely and therefore increasing the
expected investment levels by the two players. In particular, when κi < 2 the tails
of the distribution are so thick that V ar[φi] is not well defined; when κi < 1 the tails
of the distribution are even thicker and also E[φi] is not well defined. As κ1 → 0,
the mediator’s belief becomes an improper prior.
We interpret κi as a measure of how informed the mediator is about player i. If
the mediator is well informed, then κi is large, the tail of the Pareto distribution
is thin and the probability that player i turns out to be extremely powerful is low.
On the other hand, the mediator could be completely uninformed: the only thing
he may know is that player i’s power is above a certain threshold. In this case κi
is small, the tail of the Pareto distribution is thick and there is a non-negligible
probability that player i turns out to be extremely powerful.
The following proposition characterizes the solution to the mediator’s problem.
Proposition 4. The waste-minimizing sharing rule is weakly increasing in φ
1
,
weakly decreasing in φ
2
, weakly increasing in κ2, weakly decreasing in κ1.30 Fur-
thermore:
30 If the solution to the mediator’s problem is not unique, then both the smallest and the largest
waste-minimizing γ are weakly increasing in φ
1
and κ2, and weakly decreasing in φ2 and κ1.
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• for κ1, κ2 → ∞, the players power levels are φ1 and φ2 with almost cer-
tainty, and the waste minimizing sharing rule converges to the one derived in
Proposition 3.

























≤ co (so that for every γ there is a positive probability that neither














Also here, keeping κ1 and κ2 constant, as the expected strength of player i relative
to player −i increases the mediator will increase the share of ex-post surplus received




constant, the surplus share received
by player i decreases with κi and increases with κ−i. That is, each player prefers
when the mediator has a precise belief about his opponent’s power level, but an





, the expected strength of player i relative to player −i decreases





increase or κ1, κ2 decrease, the two players become more




sufficiently high or κ1, κ2 sufficiently low, the
waste minimizing sharing rule becomes extreme, allocating all ex-post surplus to
one of the two players. In less extreme cases, the waste-minimizing sharing rule is
intermediate, because each player has a low probability of investing.
A related question is whether the players would prefer to have a more knowl-
edgeable mediator, who has more precise information about both players’ power
levels. For example, the mediator may be given the ability to gather intelligence
and inspect both players, leading to an increase in both κ1 and κ2.31 To explore this
31 See, for example, the inspections of IRAN’s nuclear sites prior to the 2015 framework agree-
ment.
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possibility, let us assume κ1 = κ2 ≡ κ, meaning that the mediator’s prior beliefs
over φ1 and φ2 are equally precise.
By the previous Proposition, if φ
1
≤ co and φ2 ≤ co, the solution to the media-












if κ > 1
1 otherwise.
Again, the player expected to be stronger receives a larger share of ex-post surplus.
Note also that, as the mediator belief becomes more imprecise (lower κ), player 1
receives a larger share of ex-post surplus. Whenever κ ≤ 1, the objective function
is strictly concave and the mediator’s problem has a corner solution γ = 1.
Hence, the player who is expected to be stronger prefers a less informative belief
(in the sense of lower κ and thicker tails), while the opposite is true for the player
who is expected to be weaker. This implies that, for example, the player expected
to be weaker would want the mediator to have the ability to gather information and
inspect both players, so to have a more precise belief about their power levels. The
player expected to be stronger instead would oppose this.
5.2 Investing during the negotiation.
Suppose that the players can make investments also during the negotiation. If the
bargaining protocol announced by the mediator has fixed recognition probabilities,
then the game repeats identical in every period. It follows that the players initial
investment are also optimal in every subgame, and hence in every subgame-perfect
equilibrium the players never change their investments after period 1. Hence, when
the mediator observes the investment in patience, the results are the same as in the
main text.
This, however, may not be true for the case of random permanent proposer. In
this case, when players make their initial investment, they may not know who the
permanent proposer will be, but they will learn it at the beginning of the negoti-
ation. If the second stage of the negotiation is ever reached, they will adjust their
investment mix so to reflect this new information.
It is easy to see that, in any equilibrium, the agreement will be reached in the
first period. In making his first offer, however, the permanent proposer will keep
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into consideration the possibility that the other player may reject, go to the next
period, adjust his investment mix and therefore change the outside options of the
negotiation. Importantly, the benefit for the receiver of going to the next stage of
the negotiation depends on his discount factor, leading to positive investment in
patience. In equilibrium, therefore, allowing the players to invest in every period of
the negotiation leads to positive investment in patience.
The only random permanent proposer bargaining protocol that is therefore ex-
post efficient is one in which one of the two players is the permanent proposer with
probability 1. That is, if the mediator does not observe the investment in patience,
the only ex-post efficient bargaining protocol allocates the entire peace dividend
to one of the two players. The mediator will choose which player will receive the
entire peace dividend so to minimize the expenditure in offensive and defensive
investments.
If investments in patience are not observable, the problems analyzed in Section
4.2.1 and 4.2.2 remain the same, but now the mediator can only choose between
allocating the entire surplus to one of the two players. The derivations in Section
4.2.2 imply that the mediator will want to allocate the entire surplus to the strongest
player.
5.3 Mediation with pre-negotiation concessions
We saw that when the mediator observes either offensive and defensive investments,
or investment in patience, he can always eliminate all waste. This outcome, however,
may not be achievable if he does not observe the players’ investments. In this section
we explore whether the mediator can compensate for this lack of information by
conducting a contest for γ, that is, by announcing that the probability of being the
permanent proposer will depend on visible, costly actions taken by the players. We
allow these costly actions to benefit the other player, and therefore interpret them
as concessions.
Before the negotiation begins the mediator asks each player to make concessions
to the other player. If player i makes concessions bi ≥ 0, player i bears a cost equal
to bi while player −i enjoys a benefit equal to α · bi, where α ∈ [0, 1].32 Note that
32 Our results can be easily extended to more general expressions for the cost and benefit of
concessions, including asymmetries between the two players. However, for ease of notation, here
we assume a simple, common linear function.
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whenever α < 1, making a concession generates a welfare loss. The concessions are
used by the mediator to set the sharing rule γ, which is now
γ = f(b1, b2)
with f continuous and differentiable in both arguments, increasing and concave in
b1, decreasing and convex in b2. We assume that the function f(b1, b2) and α are
announced by the mediator at the beginning of the game. That is, the mediator can
require the players to make specific concessions (corresponding to a given α; given
costs/benefits to the player making/receiving the concession) and then use the level
of concessions to determine γ in a way that is fully anticipated by the players at the
beginning of the game.
We first present our argument under the assumption that the initial power levels
φ1 and φ2, and S are observed by the mediator and can be used to design the
function f(b1, b2). We later argue that if the mediator does not observe the initial
power levels, the contest for γ can be constructed in such a way to induce the players
to truthfully reveal φ1, φ2. and S.
In the choice of concession levels, player 1 solves




(S − u1 − u2) = 1. (12)
Similarly, player 2 solves:




(S − u1 − u2) = 1. (13)
We define the peace dividend as P ≡ S − u1 − u2, and the equilibrium level
of concessions as b1(P ); b2(P ).33 By the implicit function theorem, whenever the









33 Remember that f(b1, b2) is chosen by the mediator. Hence, making sure that the equilibrium












Note that if, similarly to a standard contest function, the mediator chooses a
function f(., .) such that ∂
2f(b1,b2)
∂b1∂b2
> 0, then if (12) and (13) hold then the equilibrium
level of concessions strictly increases with P . If instead, the equilibrium level of
concessions are determined by a corner solution at zero, then changes in P do not
affect the level of concessions — which are constant at zero. It follows that b′1(P )
and b′2(P ) have a discontinuity at the value of P such that zero concessions solve
(12) and (13).
The important observation is that by choosing the first derivatives of f(., .),
the mediator can choose the level of concession in equilibrium. If the equilibrium
level of concessions are such that the best responses have an internal solution, then
by choosing the second derivatives of f(., .) the mediator can determine how the
equilibrium level of concession reacts to changes in P . More precisely, b′1() and b′2()







Furthermore, whenever (12) and (13) hold at b1(P ) = b2(P ) = 0, the equilibrium
level of concessions react to increases in P (in a way that is determined by the
second derivatives of f(., .)) but is constant when P decreases.
Given this, we can analyze the players’ choice of offensive and defensive invest-
ments. Player 1 solves
max
o1,d1
{{u(φ1, d1, o2) + γP} − co · o1 − cd · d1 − b1(P ) + α2b2(P )} ,
s.t.
γ = f(b1(P ), b2(P ))P = S − u(φ1, d1, o2)− u(φ2, d2, o1)
By the envelope theorem, we can ignore the effect of o1 and d1 on b1. The FOC with





b′2(P )P − γ
∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂o1
− α∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂o1
b′2(P ) = co
Assuming (13) holds, the above FOC becomes:
−γ ∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂o1
+ (1− α)∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂o1
b′2(P ) = co
Therefore, player 1 anticipates that by investing in o1, he will increase the peace
dividend and therefore the concessions made by player 2. This has two effects. It
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directly benefits player 1 because concessions are something valuable to the player
receiving them. It, however, indirectly hurts player 1 because concessions by player
2 increase the share of ex-post surplus accruing to player 2. If α < 1 the negative
effect dominates, and player 1 decreases his investment in offensive technology to
reduce the intensity of the contest over γ. If instead α = 1 the two effects cancel out
and the contest for γ has no impact on o1, in the sense that the FOC is the same
derived in Section 4.2.2 for the case of a fixed γ announced at the beginning of the
game.





b′2(P )P + (1− γ)
∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂d1
− α∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂d1
b′2(P ) = cd,
Assuming (12) holds, we have:
(1− γ)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂d1
+ (1− α)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂d1
b′2(P ) = cd,
In this case, whenever α < 1 the contest over γ increases the benefit of making a
defensive investment. The intuition is the reverse of what discussed in the previous
section. A defensive investment decreases the ex-post surplus to be shared in the
contest and therefore the incentive of both players to perform monetary payments.
Hence, by making a defensive investment, player i can decrease b−i and obtain a
higher surplus share during the negotiation. If instead α = 1, the contest for γ
has no impact on the investment made by player 1. Following similar steps, we can
derive the two FOCs for player 2. The FOC for o2 is
−(1− γ)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂o2
+ (1− α)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂o2
b′1(P ) = co,




+ (1− α)∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂d2
b′1(P ) = cd,
To summarize the above observations: whenever (12) and (13) holds, the contest
for γ can be used to discourage offensive investments. The reason is that offensive
investments increase the peace dividend and therefore the intensity of the “fight” in
the concession game. This logic however also implies that the contest for γ may
increase the incentives to make defensive investments. If instead the contest for γ
has corner solutions, (12) and (13) do not hold. In this case b′1(P ) = b′2(P ) = 0, and
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the contest for γ does not affect the choice of optimal investment. The FOCs are
again the ones derived in Section 4.2.2 for the case of a fixed γ announced at the
beginning of the game.
An important case is when (12) and (13) hold at b1 = b2 = 0. In this case, b′1(P )
and b′2(P ) are positive for changes in the investment mix that increase the peace
dividend (i.e., either an increase in offensive investment or a decrease in offensive
investments) and are zero otherwise. In this case the contest for γ can be used to
discourage offensive investments, without affecting the incentives to make defensive
investments.
We are now ready to derive conditions under which the mediator can achieve full







S − φ1 − φ2






low, so that concessions
are very sensitive to increases in P . As a consequence, both players expect that if
they set positive offensive investments, they will increase the peace dividend and
therefore generate a large concession from the opponent. If α < 1 this expectation
draws offensive investment to zero. This strategy achieves full efficiency if the two
players do not want to make defensive investments, that is, whenever
(1− γ)φ1 ≤ cd
γφ2 ≤ cd,










Proof of Proposition 5. The “if” part is shown in the text. For the “only if” part,
note that the contest for γ cannot be used to achieve efficiency by discouraging
defensive investments. To achieve efficiency the equilibrium level of concession must
be zero. If, starting from zero concessions, a player makes a defensive investment,
the peace dividend will decrease and the concession level will be unchanged and
equal to zero. Hence the incentives to make defensive investments are unaffected
by the presence of the contest for γ when this contest is designed so to induce no
concessions in equilibrium.
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Few points are worth noting. First, despite the fact that there is no waste in
equilibrium, the contest is effective only if α < 1. That is, concessions need to
be an inefficient way to transfer surplus among players. They cannot be monetary
transfers, but should rather be “in kind” transfers. The proposition shows that the
mediator can achieve full efficiency as long as he can require the players to make
concessions that are wasteful.
Second, although there is no welfare loss in equilibrium, the contest should gen-
erate inefficiencies off equilibrium (i.e., for positive offensive investment). Interest-
ingly, here the mediator can easily commit to destroying welfare off equilibrium.
The reason is that the mediator does not observe the player’s investments. Hence,
following a positive offensive investment, the mediator has no incentive to modify
the function f(b1, b2) so to avoid costly concessions.
Corollary 3. 1. If cd < φ1φ2φ1+φ2 , then the mediator cannot achieve full efficiency.
2. If cd > φ1φ2φ1+φ2 and cd <
φ1
2
then to achieve full efficiency the mediator needs to
implement γ > 1
2
.
3. If cd > φ1 the mediator can achieve full efficiency and implement any sharing
rule γ ∈ (0, 1).
By comparing the above corollary with Proposition 3, we see that introducing
the contest for γ helps to achieve full efficiency whenever cd > co. If instead cd ≤ co,
the set of parameters for which the mediator can achieve full efficiency is the same
with and without contest for γ. Simialry, if full efficiency is achievable, then there
is a potential tradeoff between faireness and efficiency. Whenever cd > co, this
tradeoff is less likely to emerge when the mediator uses a contest for γ. When
instead cd ≤ co this the set of parameters for which this tradeoff emerges is the same
with and without the contest.
What happen when efficiency is not achievable? The following lemma shows that
it is never profitable to generate a welfare loss in the form of positive concessions in
order to reduce pre-bargaining wasteful investments.
Lemma 5. Suppose that α < 1. The welfare-maximizing f(., .) is such that b1(P ) =
b2(P ) = 0.
As already discussed, starting from zero concessions the mediator can punish any
investment that increases the size of the peace dividend but is unable to discourage
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investments that decrease the peace dividend.34 Together with the above lemma,
this implies that the mediator will use the contest for γ to drive offensive investments



















Again, the mediator will minimize waste by choosing
γ = 1− cd
φ2
so that only player 2 invests in defense. Note that if cd < φ1φ2φ1+φ2 (so that efficiency




and the mediator, again, favors the strongest
player. The following proposition summarizes these observations.
Proposition 6. Suppose that cd < φ1φ2φ1+φ2 , so that efficiency is not achievable. The
mediator will use the contest for γ to eliminate offensive investments. The mediator
minimizes defensive investments by setting





Proof. In the text.
These results are basically the same derived in Section 4.2.2, with the only
difference being that, here, the mediator chooses γ exclusively to minimize defensive
investments.
Unobservable S, φ1 and φ2.
Suppose cd > φ1, so that, thanks to the contest, the mediator can achieve full
efficiency and implement any sharing rule γ ∈ (0, 1) (while, if co is sufficiently low,
absent the contest there will be positive waste in equilibrium). We want to argue
that, because of the contest for γ, if the mediator cannot observe S, φ1 and φ2, can
elicit them from the two players, which is in sharp contrast with the case considered
in Section 5.1.




(so that the player’s equilibrium
concessions levels are always identical) and f(b1, b2)|b1=b2 = γ (so that the sharing
34 This is a consequence of the “only if” part of Proposition 5. See its proof for all details.
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rule implemented is constant in equilibrium). It follows that the players cannot
manipulate the allocation of the ex-post surplus by misreporting S, φ1 or φ2. The
only effect of misreporting is to, potentially, cause positive concessions and positive
offensive investment in equilibrium. However, it is easy to see that no player can
benefit from inducing positive offensive investments and positive concession. Sup-
pose a player expects his report to have an effect on the function f(., .). Because
player i’s concessions and investment are optimal given f(., .), by an envelope argu-
ment manipulating f(., .) affects player i’s utility only because it may induce player
−i to change his behavior. It is however evident that player i cannot do better than
reporting truthfully and inducing player −i to set both concessions and investments
to zero.
If instead cd < φ1, ether the mediator can achieve full efficiency only at some
γ, or he cannot achieve full efficiency at all. In the first case, the possibility of
eliciting a truthful report about S, φ1 and φ2 depends, again, on the parameters.
If efficiency can be achieved at the same γ for every possible S, φ1 and φ2, then
the logic discussed above continues to hold. The mediator can ask the players to
report S, φ1 and φ2, which are then used to determine the shape of f(., .) so to
generate zero waste. Because the sharing rule can be made independent from the
reports, the players have no incentives to misreport. If instead there is no γ that
achieves efficiency for all possible values of S, φ1 and φ2, then this argument will
fail, because the mediator cannot commit to maintain the same sharing rule for all
possible reports, making truthful reporting impossible.
Similarly, if the mediator is unable to eliminate all waste, the the waste-minimizing
sharing rule will depend on the players’ report, who therefore will not report truth-
fully.
6 Conclusions
We have studied a bargaining problem in which players may invest/waste valuable
resources in order to improve their negotiating outcome. These investments could be
aimed at shifting the outside options—the equilibrium payoffs of the non-cooperative
game played in case of breakdown of the negotiation—or the cost of delaying the
agreement—typically interpreted as the time discount factor. In the absence of a
mediator, the negotiation is conducted as a standard bargaining game in alternating
offers. We show that each player benefits from performing at least one of the two
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types of investments.
We then examine whether a mediator can help in reducing waste. We assume
that the mediator controls the bargaining protocol: the probability that, in each
period of the negotiation, a given negotiating party will propose to the other. The
mediator cannot commit to destroying welfare. Nonetheless, we show that if the
mediator can observe either the investments aimed at manipulating the discount
factors, or the investment aimed at manipulating the outside options, he can always
achieve efficiency. If instead he cannot observe neither type of investment, then
there could be waste in equilibrium. Furthermore, to reduce waste, the mediator
may need to penalize the weakest player, who is the one with the strongest incentive
to undertake wasteful investments. This result is robust to different assumptions
regarding what the mediator can observe, and highlights a conflict between fairness
and efficiency arising in negotiations. Relative to the existing literature on mediation
in political science, our paper shows that the mediator can be biased not because of
his preferences, but strategically to minimize social waste.
Our analysis suggests several additional lines for future research. For example,
our framework can be used to explore the choice between mediated and unmediated
negotiation. Despite the fact that the mediator may favor the strongest player, the
weakest player may nevertheless prefer a mediated negotiation over an unmediated
one, because of the reduction in wasteful investment. Also, we have showed that the
precision of the mediator’s information affects the sharing rule implemented. Our
results suggest that the weakest player benefits from a more informed mediator while
the opposite is true for the strongest player, but the full analyses of the strategic
choice of transparency remains to be completed.
Also, we have assumed away inefficiencies arising at the negotiation stage and
focused exclusively on inefficiencies arising before the start of the negotiation. How-
ever, several authors have drawn a connection between pre-bargaining wasteful in-
vestments and inefficiencies arising within the negotiation (see Powell, 1993, Kydd,
2000, Slantchev, 2005, Meirowitz and Sartori, 2008, Jackson and Morelli, 2009). For
example, an arms build up prior to the negotiation may increase the chance that
an agreement is found and therefore increase the efficiency of the negotiation, either
because it makes war more costly or because it reduces the asymmetry of informa-
tion between players. On the other hand, a military mobilization may decrease the
probability of reaching an agreement and the efficiency of the negotiation because it
generates a hands-tying effect : a decrease in the cost of starting a war that operates
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as a public commitment device. Extending our model to the case in which ineffi-
ciencies during the negotiation stage are present, and are affected by inefficiencies
arising before the negotiation is also left for future work.
Finally, the fact that in order to reduce wasteful investment the mediator may
favor the strongest player opens an additional potential problem. If the initial
power levels are endogenous, then each player has the incentive to become the
strongest player in order to obtain a more favorable share of the ex-post surplus,
potentially leading to very high level of wasteful investment. Consider, for example,
the model discussed in Section 4.2.2 in which the initial power levels are observable
by players and mediator. Assume now that the investments are done in two steps:
the players can invest before the mediator announces the sharing rule as well as
after the announcement. The initial investments are observable by the mediator.
By Proposition 3, the mediator sets γ? = 1 − min{cd,co}
max{φ1,φ2} , where we allow for either
player 1 or 2 to be the strongest depending on their initial investment.
Hence, if the players have the opportunity to make an investment before the
mediator announces the sharing rule, the player who is the weakest ex-ante will
benefit from making an offensive investment. This way, in the moment the mediator
announces the sharing rule, the other player will be weaker than at the start of the
game and therefore will receive a lower share of ex-post surplus. Possibly, the
weakest player may become the strongest player and receive the majority of the
ex-post surplus. The other player will anticipate this and may invest as well. The
expectation of the mediator’s intervention leads to wasteful investments before the
intervention of the mediator.
Note that the above logic holds also when the mediator can announce the sharing
rule at the beginning of the game (i.e., before d̂i and ôi are set) but cannot commit
to it. That is because the mediator will always revise the sharing rule after observing
d̂i and ôi, leading to the same conclusions we have obtained above. Therefore, a
benevolent mediator who lacks the power to commit to a sharing rule may cause a
higher level of social waste than a mediator who simply implements an exogenously
given sharing rule. The ability of the mediator to commit may therefore be key
to the reduction of wasteful investments. Analyzing different ways in which the
mediator can acquire this commitment remains an open problem.
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Mathematical derivations
Proof of Proposition 1. The discussion in the text implies that, if an equilibrium
exists and φ2 > min{co, cd}, then there will be positive investment in equilibrium—
either in patience or offensive/defensive. What is left to show is the existence of the
equilibrium
For given offensive and defensive investment, the existence of the equilibrium in
the patience investment game is guaranteed by the fact that the set of actions βi is








> u1 v2 = S − v1 > u2.
the argument we made in the main text implies that in every equilibria there will
be positive investment in patience.
Consider now the choice of offensive and defensive investments. The key obser-
vation is that the benefit for player i of making a defensive investment is always
smaller or equal to
ui(φi, di, o−i) = φi(2− e−di)e−o−i
that is, the benefit in case player i earns the entire ex-post surplus. This implies
that any defensive investment larger than d̂ : φi(2 − ed̂i) = cod̂ is dominated by
d = 0. Hence, player i optimal investment in defense must be within [0, d̂].
Similarly, the benefit for player −i of making an offensive investment is always
smaller or equal to
ui(φi, di, o−i) = S − φi(2− e−di)e−o−i
This implies that any offensive investment larger than ô : S − 2φie−ô−i = coô is
dominated by o−i = 0. Hence, player −i optimal investment in offense must be
within [0, ô].
Again, the set of possible actions in the game in which players make offensive
and defensive investment is compact, and therefore an equilibrium must exist.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider a generic bargaining protocol in which player 1 pro-
poses first. To start, note that for a bargaining protocol to achieve efficiency, in
equilibrium the agreement must be reached immediately. Call v2,t=2 player 2’s ex-
pected payoff in period 2.
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There are two possible cases. The first is β2v2,t=2 ≥ u2, that is, the present
discounted value of player 2’s continuation payoff is greater than the payoff in case
of conflict. In this case, in equilibrium, player 1 will offer β2v2,t=2 immediately
so that player 2 is indifferent between accepting and rejecting. The second case
is β2v2,t=2 < u2, so that player 1 will offer u2 and player 2 is indifferent between
accepting and triggering the conflict.
We want to show that v2 must be an increasing function of β2, so that when
β2v2,t=2 ≥ u2 then player 2 will want to invest in patience. Call v2,s the payoff
achieved by player 2 if stage s of the negotiation is reached. It is easy to see that,
for given v2,s, all v2,t for t < s are increasing in β2 (this can be formally shown
via an induction argument that we omit). As s → ∞ its impact on v2,t=2 becomes
negligible. It follows that β2v2,t=2 is strictly increasing in β2. If β2v2,t=2 ≥ u2,
therefore, the players’ payoffs depend on the players’ discount factors, leading to an
investment in patience.
Therefore, the only bargaining protocol in which player 1 proposes first that
do not lead to investment in patience by player 2 are those such that player 2 is
kept at its outside option. In this case the outcome is equivalent to that achieved
when player 1 is the permanent proposer. The same reasoning applies to bargaining
protocol that leave player 1 at his outside option, and bargaining protocol that
randomize between leaving player 1 and player 2 at their outside options.
Proof of Proposition 3. For cd ≥ co, we argued in the text that there is no defensive
investments. Also, o?1 is zero if γ ≤ coφ2 , and o
?
2 is zero if γ ≥ 1− coφ1 . Hence, wasteful














For γ < co
φ2
we have that o1 = 0 and o2 is strictly decreasing in γ. For γ > 1 − coφ1
we have that o2 = 0 and o1 is strictly increasing in γ. Therefore, it has to be that






































Hence, the mediator minimizes γ(1−γ) over the relevant interval. It can be verified
that when φ1 ≥ φ2—as we assume throughout—and co < φ1φ2φ1+φ2 this minimum is
always reached at γ? = 1− co
φ1
.
For cd < co, consider the total expenditure fighting over player 2’s outside option,
with player 1 attacking and player 2 defending:
co · o1 + cd · d2 =



























Similarly, consider the total expenditure fighting over player 1’s outside option:
co·o2+cd·d1 =







































co · (o1 + o2) + cd · (d1 + d2) =

strictly decreasing if γ ≤ cd
φ2
strictly concave if cd
φ2




Hence, total expenditure co ·(o1+o2)+cd ·(d1+d2) is minimized either at γ = cdφ2 ,
where the expenditures fighting over 2’s outside options is zero, or at γ = 1 − cd
φ1
where the expenditures fighting over 1’s outside options is zero. At these two values
total expenditures are




































































and total waste is minimized




Proof of Lemma 4. To start, note that if φi is Pareto-distributed with minimum x
















= Pr {φi ≤ eyx}







which is the CDF of an exponential distribution with parameter κ.

































































if φ2 ≤ coγ
1 otherwise






















































































































Whenever κ1, κ2 → ∞, the uncertainty about the players power level disappears.
The solution to the mediator’s problem is the one derived in Section 4.2.2.









































≤ γ ≤ co
φ
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which is continuous in γ. We solve the mediator’s problem by considering few
separate cases:
• κ1, κ2 ≤ 1. In this case A(γ), B(γ), C(γ) and D(γ) are all concave. By
continuity of 17, the solution can only be at the extremes, and hence the















• κ1, κ2 > 1. In this case A′(0) < 0 and D′(1) > 0 and therefore the solution
is never an extreme value. If, furthermore co > φ1 > φ2, then the mediator
problem is to minimize B(γ), which is convex. Hence the solution to the
mediator’s problem is





→ ∞, the mediator’s objective function converges to C(γ),
















which is the γ minimizing C(γ).
To characterize the solution to the mediator’s problem in all other cases, we take




, κ1, κ2 and then invoke Topkis’s theorem.
The derivative of 17 with respect to φ
1































































which is weakly positive. By Topkis’s theorem, therefore, the waste-minimizing
sharing rule is weakly increasing in φ
1
, κ2; weakly decreasing in φ2, κ1.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose b1(P ) > 0 and b2(P ) > 0. The four FOCs determining
the level of offensive and defensive investments are
−γ ∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂o1
+ (1− α)∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂o1
b′2(P ) ≤ co
(1− γ)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂d1
+ (1− α)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂d1
b′2(P ) ≤ cd
−(1− γ)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂o2
+ (1− α)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂o2




+ (1− α)∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂d2
b′1(P ) ≤ cd,
Note how b′i(P ) decreases player i’s incentive to make an offensive investment but
increases player i’s incentive to make defensive investments.
Supoose instead that b1(P ) = b2(P ) = 0. Assume furthermore that (12) and
(13) hold at b1(P ) = b2(P ) = 0. The four FOCs determining the level of offensive
and defensive investments are
−γ ∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂o1
+ (1− α)∂u(φ2, d2, o1)
∂o1
b′2(P ) ≤ co
(1− γ)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂d1
≤ c′d(d1)
−(1− γ)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂o2
+ (1− α)∂u(φ1, d1, o2)
∂o2






Note how, in this case, b′i(P ) decreases player i’s incentive to make an offensive
investment but has no impact on player i’s incentive to make defensive investments.
Remember that b′1(P ) and b′2(P ) are determined by the mediator. The mediator
can therefore always choose them so that offensive investment is lower when b1(P ) =
b2(P ) = 0 then b1(P ) > 0 and b2(P ) > 0. Furthermore, the left hand side of
the FOCs for the defensive investments are lower under b1(P ) = b2(P ) = 0 than
b1(P ) > 0 and b2(P ) > 0 for any level of b′1(P ) and b′2(P ). That is, it is possible
to move from b1(P ) > 0 and b2(P ) > 0 to b1(P ) = b2(P ) = 0, while decreasing all
investments.
Finally, note that if b1(P ) > 0 and b2(P ) > 0 and all investments are already





, while at the same time maintaining b′1(P ) and b′2(P ) (and with
it the incentives to make offensive and defensive investments) constant. This is
welfare increasing because it eliminates concessions (which are socially costly) while
maintaining all investments at zero.
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